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 Fire ArticlesSHIPBOARD FIRE FIGHTING Fire aboard a ship at sea is one of a seafarer's worst fears. Fighting a serious fire tests the crew and equipment to the limit. Ken Martin, the retired Deputy Firemaster, Highland and Islands Fire Brigade, Scotland, describes how a blaze aboard a Russian factory ship was brought under control. At approximately 1500 hours on Thursday July 29 a member of the ship's crew aboard the 12,500 tonne Kalingrad-registered CHERNMORSKYA SLAVA, a Russian factory ship, noticed smoke issuing from the hatch covers of hold 5C which was located directly below the process deck and forward of the fish meal plant and engine space. The vessel was anchored one mile north of Bressay and outside harbour limits and was one of 70 or more vessels of the Klondyker fleet anchored in and around Lerwick, Shetland, at that time. The Master of the vessel ordered first aid fire fighting with hand-held jets from the ship's main, but this proved ineffective due possibly to the poor mains pressure available and the fact that the team were driven back by heat and smoke. He decided to batten down and use the CO 2 flooding system having assumed, erroneously as it turned out, that the hold was sealed. The system operated satisfactorily but failed to extinguish the fire. At around 1800 hours a Lerwick-based shipping agent on a routine visit to the vessel noticed the fire and after discussion with the Master advised him to inform the Coastguard. The Master was reluctant to do so at first but as the fire situation worsened he conceded to the agent's request and a call for assistance was received at Coastguard Rescue Centre - Lerwick at 1845 hours, nearly four hours after the fire was discovered. The Coastguard alerted Fire Brigade Control at Inverness that there was a fire aboard the vessel at 1846 hours. The brigade's offshore response team was in the process of being set up at the time with 17 firefighters in each team and teams based in Shetland, Orkney and the Western Isles. The teams had been set up initially at the request of the islands' Council's of the three Island groups, amid concerns for ferry travelers following a number of high profile incidents in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Discussions with the Coastguard relating to a "memorandum of understanding" were underway with UK Fire Services with coastal responsibilities. Although all teams had received training including specialised ship fire fighting and offshore survival the final commissioning order had not be promulgated at this time. DECISION TO MOBILISE In any incident offshore the decision to mobilise lies with the Firemaster and in this case he gave permission for the Shetland Unit to be mobilised to stand by at a predetermined embarkation point. By 1938 hours a Sub Officer and five firefighters from Lerwick had been assembled and were transported to the vessel by harbour launch from Lerwick arriving at 1956 hours. On arrival the Sub Officer found smoke issuing from the hatches of the hold immediately forward of the accommodation and engine room. He proceeded to the bridge and established contact with the Master and Ship's Engineer who informed him that the fire had been discovered at approximately 1500 hours on that day in Number 5 hold on C deck, one deck below the Process deck in a cargo of 100t of flat packed cardboard cartons used in the fish packing process. Discussions with the Master and Ship's Engineer and perusal of the ship's plans enabled the sub officer to ascertain that the B deck immediately below also contained a similar cargo and that A deck was empty. The Ship's Engineer informed him that these holds were refrigerated holds but were not being utilised in this mode at this time. The plans revealed that there was an access hatch on the starboard side from the fish process deck and having been assured that this was the only access and that the hold was sealed, the Officer in Charge decided that the most appropriate method of attack would be to attempt to flood the hold with high-expansion foam and he requested extra foam stocks and men to be flown out. Conditions appeared to be deteriorating at this time and the Coastguard prevailed upon the Master to consider evacuation and this was commenced at about 2100 hours when 50% of the 162 crew members were transferred to a sister vessel which had drawn alongside. The fire fighting operation was commenced at 2200 hours and continued for two hours. Although the attack appeared to pacify the fire it did not prove successful in extinguishing the fire for reasons that will be explained later, and the demands for foam compounds soon exceeded supply enforcing the adoption of a "stop-go" strategy. As the vessel was lying about three miles off Lerwick, attempts were made to persuade the Master to move to a berth alongside. This was met with point blank refusal due possibly to the fact that the owners would become liable for harbour dues, in addition to which her sister ship the Darius already lay impounded at Dales Voe Pier for non-payment of dues. At 0200 hours on Friday 30 July and after the initial crew had been committed for several hours, the Officer in Charge requested relief crews be made available at 0300 hours. At this time it was becoming increasingly apparent that the logistics of re-supply of foam and compressed air cylinders for operators working in the smoke-logged conditions on the process deck was becoming critical and renewed efforts were made to persuade the Master to move the vessel inshore but met with no success. Conditions on board by this time had stabilised, and the Master, perceiving the vessel to be in no immediate danger, allowed some of the crew to return to the vessel from other fishing vessels in the fleet, where they had sought refuge during the night. By this time tug assistance had arrived and deployed cooling monitors to the hull as well as augmenting the onboard fire water supply from their fire fighting pumps. The Firemaster decided to supplement the Shetland team with a team from Orkney and to send the Divisional Commander from C Division, Divisional Officer Ken Martin to assume overall command of the incident. A request also went out to Grampian Fire Brigade for assistance and they responded with a team of eight firefighters. After establishing contact with the Coastguard the Divisional Officer accompanied the relief crews to the vessel and was briefed by the departing Sub Officer. The vessel at this time was showing signs of blistering on the starboard side of the hull consistent with the level of the fire on C deck. Bunker fuel in wing tanks had been diverted and replaced with water. CHANGE OF TACTICS After some negotiation with the Master, a change of tactics ensued whereby a concentrated attack with eight jets via the main hatch was attempted and although partially successful, the accumulation of water a four-degree list which was the maximum the Master would allow. At this a further access hatch not shown on the ship's plan was located on the port side of the process deck and a team was committed with a jet to attempt to establish a foothold on C deck, taking a BA guide line should a retreat in the smoke be necessary. Conditions were extremely punishing and the duration of the breathing apparatus (BA) sets was reduced to as little as 15 min but the exercise confirmed that there was a well-established fire in the centre of the hold and on the starboard side and that stacks of cardboard some three metres high were becoming unstable and indeed had collapsed into a heap in the centre, engulfing the narrow access gangways. The BA. team retreated and no further attempt was made to establish a presence on C deck, at this time.
The logistics of supplying foam compound and compressed air cylinders which required charging onshore was proving difficult and resulted in an interrupted fire fighting strategy. The main mode of transport over the first 24-hour period had been by lifeboat. All reliefs had been used up and the Royal National Lifeboat institution (RNLI) had to discontinue its operation in order that it could be made ready for a life-threatening emergency, bearing in mind that the situation on-board the casualty was no longer life threatening. Consultation with the Coastguard and Lerwick Harbour Trust resulted in an auxiliary vessel, The Knap, being made available. This vessel was considerably slower and added forty minutes to the round trip for supplies. The difficulties in removing firewater were alleviated by utilising the ship's own fire fighting crew to check boundaries and clear clogged strum boxes. These firefighters were very committed individuals and worked extremely hard for the duration of the incident. As none of these firefighters spoke English, contact had to be made via the Ship's Engineer who was the on-site manager of the incident from the ship's crew. It is worth noting that some of our initial firefighters had spent 27 hours on board before being relieved. Fire fighting continued throughout Friday and during that night using a combination of foam, jets and thermal imaging cameras to locate the seat of the fire, but by Saturday the difficulties of re-supply meant that the only effective way of tackling the fire was for the vessel to be brought alongside. A meeting at the Coastguard Rescue Centre between the emergency services and the harbour authorities and Shetland islands Council Emergency Planning Team issued the Master an ultimatum informing him that the fire fighting effort would have to be abandoned unless he allowed his vessel to be moved to Dales Voe deep water terminal. All agencies concerned were unaware at this time that the vessel had lost steerage, as a result of cables passing from the bridge forward to the engine room being destroyed by the fire. At this time a request was made to Trafalgar House to put pressure on the owner to allow the Master to accommodate the request. The Master hinted that he would clear for sea and make for his home port, but because of the technical problems mentioned above, finally requested tug assistance into port. At 1500 hours on Saturday the vessel assisted by the tugs KIRKBISTER and STANECHUCKER berthed alongside the DARIUS at Dales Voe. This concluded the co-ordination role of the Coastguard and the centre of operations moved to Lerwick Fire Station District Office. The advantages of a shore-based continuous attack on the fire were immediately obvious and by Saturday evening the fire was suppressed enough to allow a tentative foray into hold 5C. The euphoria was to be short-lived however, as it became apparent that the access hatch to B deck was open and that the fire had spread via that route and open freezer compartment ventilators into the deck below which, as previously mentioned, also contained on cardboard cartons. By Sunday morning crews had established a full presence (three teams) on C deck and one two-man team had fought their way down the ladder access onto B deck and were preparing to enter for a reconnaissance when timber flooring gave way and plunging one fire fighter down onto A deck which contained about one metre of water at this time. Luckily this broke his fall and he was able to relocate the access ladder and make his way back up to B deck where his companion (who had activated his distress signal unit) and other colleagues assisted him to the main deck. In view of the danger posed by the B deck flooring it was decided to tackle that fire by extinguishing C deck first and clearing the main hatches so that fire fighting jets could be got to work that way. By late Sunday the fire on B deck had also been subdued and on Monday the work began of clearing access on C deck. Work was hampered due to the lack of portside lifting facilities and small teams had to be employed to work the cargo by hand, turning over and damping down. BA wearing was still necessary and this also extended the clearing up operation. 'Work continued during the week and the fire was declared out at 2124 hours on Thursday, 5 August 1993. The whole incident had utilized the services of three fire brigades, the Coastguard and its SAR wing. Police and the RNLI as well as the valuable contribution by Lerwick Harbour Trust and BP Sullum Voe and Shetlands Islands Council Emergencv Planning Section. One hundred and fifty fire fighters used 250 BA cylinders in the weeklong operation and 500 gallons of foam compound were used, some shipped from as far away as Wick and Aberdeen. THE INVESTIGATION A subsequent fire investigation was carried out by the author assisted by Sub Officer Anderson (the officer in charge of the first attendance). Inspection of the hold 5C where the fire originated revealed that although cargo had been turned over and dampened down, it had not been discharged due to an absence of shore side facilities and remained in both affected holds, although access to main hatches and access ladders had been cleared and areas where parts of the floor timber had been burnt away had been suitably cordoned. The insulation of each hold consisting of cork and polystyrene-backed aluminium facings had been almost totally consumed in the fire and the bulkhead between number 5 and number 4 holds which housed the refrigeration plan bore testimony that the fire passed through from C deck to B deck as the ventilators were stuck in the open position. This also explained why initial CO2, and high expansion foam attacks were only partially successful. The inspection also revealed damage to the steering cables on the starboard side and the heat distortion of the steel load bearing floor beams supporting the floor of the process deck. The severest damage was evident in the forward starboard corner of the hold 5C and extended along the starboard section the length of the hold. Earlier observations had concluded that housekeeping was poor on the vessel and that there did not appear to be any non-smoking areas. The casual way in which crews discarded smoking materials had also been commented on during fire fighting operations. As it was not possible to clear the cargo, a categorical cause of fire was difficult to determine. The following were plausible causes but listed in no particular order of priority. a) Careless disposal of smoking materials - from observations made during the fire and the fact that there were gaps in the main hatch covers. b) Wilful fire raising - at the time the Master stated "that he did not have reason to suspect this cause" as he had not encountered recent personnel problems aboard. Subsequent reports in 1994 however indicated that the vessel had again caught fire in her home port with the loss of three lives. This however was never substantiated. c) Electrical - the vessel was generally in a poor state of repair and the areas affected contained electrical equipment. There was a so evidence of rodents aboard. d) Direct ignition of the cargo due to close proximity to a light source. No direct evidence, but the height of the stacks of cardboard was such that some material may have come into contact with artificial electrical lighting. CONCLUSIONS Problems associated with the incident.
The Dales Voe terminal has no dockside crane facilities and this led to the incident becoming protracted as the cargo could not be discharged, but only hoisted to deck level turned over, extinguished fully and returned to segregated areas in the affected holds. Fire safety legislation and the Fire Services Act in the UK make provision for periodic inspection of high risk installations on shore but this does not extend to vessels tied alongside or more particularly those at anchor in harbour limits. Until such time as routine inspections for familiarisation and follow-up exercises can be conducted on visiting vessels then successful fire fighting will remain more difficult and serious than firefighters normally encounter in the course of their duties. As a result of the above incident a code of practice was drawn up by the Marine Safety Agency, which required safety inspections of all vessels, in and around Shetland and other ports, associated with the Klondyker fleet. The considerable cost to the Harbour Authority and the Fire Services involved was refunded in full after protracted negotiations. Since the incident the Highland and Islands Fire Brigade has introduced ultra lightweight carbon/kevlar composite cylinders in order to reduce wearer stress and increase working duration. SELECTION OF ADAPTERS Due to the variety of fittings on the fire fighting systems of foreign vessels a selection of adapters to a variety of shipping using the North Sea have been purchased. The contribution made by thermal imaging cameras has been recognised and all the teams are issued with such devices. Work is also on-going in the Fire Service to develop remote controlled thermal imaging and infra red systems that would allow rapid assessment of fire scenarios similiar to the above, where the deployment of firefighters may be hazardous. The use of a mixture of communications systems at this incident prompted the Brigade to train up some team members in marine radio procedures via the Coastguard Agency. Marine band licenses have since been issued to operators in each team.
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