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 Marine ArticlesTHE ANATOMY OF A FIRE The M.V. "UNION ROTOMA" Story The Union Rotoma is a New Zealand flagged Ro-Ro with a LOA of 207 metres and a deadweight capacity of nearly 13,000 tonnes. The Rotoma is powered by twin SEMT Pielsticks with a total output of 13,428KW. On Tuesday April 19th, 1994, the ship was en route from New Zealand to Australia. 1835 Fire Alarm. Fire indicated in engine room zone 3. Within a short time most other zones in the engine room were also in the alarm condition. The Duty Engineer (3/E) went to the engine room to investigate. The 2/E went to his cabin to change into coveralls and collect his UHF radio. The Master went to the bridge. There was a slight smell of smoke in the alleyways. The 3/E reported on the radio that there was a fire on top of the Port Main Engine at the aft end and that the flames were less than a metre high. The 2/E and extra 3/E also entered the engine room. Muster bells were activated and a PA announcement was made. The 2/E and extra 3/E reached the engine control room. Flames were now licking at the engine room deck head. At a Muster station a head count confirmed that all crew are accounted for and Compressed Air Breathing Apparatus was prepared. The Chief Engineer discussed the situation with the Second Mate and arranged the shutdown of the engine room ventilation system and flaps in preparation for possible CO2 flooding of the engine room. 1845 Electrical power on the ship was provided by shaft generator. The 3/E attempted to change over to the diesel alternators prior to shutting down the main engine which was on fire. Smoke and heat eventually forced the 3/E to evacuate the engine room. Simultaneously the 2/E advised the Chief Engineer by UHF that the fire was not going to be easily contained. The C/E ordered the evacuation of the engine room and requested the bridge to operate the remote stops for the main engine. The main engine was stopped. The Master transmitted a Distress Alert via INMARSAT C which was quickly acknowledged by MRCC in Canberra. The 2/E advised that the engine room was clear of personnel and then operated the quick-closing fuel shut-off valves on the bridge deck. The C/E opened the lid of the CO2 release box which automatically operated the CO2 alarms, then, having been informed that the engine room was clear, activated the CO2 release. The 2/M, Bosun and three seamen used the CO2 check list to ensure that all engine room flaps were shut. The engine room vents on #3 deck could not be accessed due to smoke. A BA team was called in to access the vents. The Mate and a seaman donned BA sets and entered #4 deck from the after end. Visibility inside was less than two metres. They found an open escape/stores hatch on #3 deck through which thick smoke was issuing. All other apertures were found shut. The diesel alternator in the engine room was stifled by the CO2 atmosphere and a short blackout occurred until the emergency generator started and came on line automatically. "Having been reassured by the fact that the running generator had stopped, indicating the CO2 was effectively blanketing the engine room, the engineers felt sufficiently confident to make their way to the duty mess for a coffee and to take stock of the operation." 2010 The 2/E and 3/E donned BA again and re-entered the engine room to assess the situation. 2030 The 2/E and 3/E confirmed the fire was out. The C/E passed a situation report to the Master who immediately cancelled the Distress Alert. The CO2 extraction fan system was started and the funnel flaps and engine room escape hatch were opened up to assist ventilation. Using BA, two engineers restarted the diesel alternator using an emergency air start reservoir. Having done this, the main electrical system was restored and the engine room vent fans were then started. 2232 The fire parties stood down. The engineers investigated the cause of the fire. One by one the fuel and lubricating pumps were started. "When the lubricating oil pump for the starboard engine was started, oil sprayed from a fractured pipe at the after end of the engine, above the inboard camshaft anchor bearing housing. It was found that all the securing set bolts and one of the locating dowels for this bearing housing had failed allowing the housing to move out of the entablature thus fracturing the oil pipe which had been secured to it. Oil under pressure had then sprayed over the after end of the port engine igniting on the hot exhaust trunking adjacent to the turbocharger." 0042 (April 20) Several sensors and trips had to be by-passed before the port engine could be started. The ship resumed passage on one engine, the starboard engine having been made inoperable due to the failed camshaft anchor bearing. The ship's organization received some good press in the conclusions of the Marine Accident Investigation Unit Report (No. 68) into the incident. "The response of the ship's fire fighting organization was both fast and effective. This was due in large part to the fact that all the officers and key personnel had personal UHF radios and excellent communications were maintained between all those involved throughout the incident." The above report was taken from a precis of the Australian Marine Incident Investigation Unit Report #68 which was published in the NI New Zealand Branch Newsletter. Printed in Seaways (Journal of the Nautical Institute.)
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